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INTRODUCTION
In 2010 Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act,1 a comprehensive legislative response to the
market crash of 2008.2 Dodd-Frank is a major initiative aimed at
strengthening and expanding the existing regulatory structure under which
financial markets operate.3 In that respect, Dodd-Frank is not unique.
* Senior Editor, Volume 164, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate,
2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 2013, Duke University. I would like to
thank Professor David Skeel for his insightful comments throughout the writing process,
and my friends at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their
collective effort in bringing this work to publication.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12,
15, 22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON
REG. 91, 96 (2012) (“The Dodd-Frank Act was the government’s historic response to the
causes of the economic crisis.”).
3. See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376 (setting the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act as
that to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system”); see also Barr, supra note 2, at 92 (asserting that

573

ARTICLE 6_PETKOVA 2-12.DOCX (PETKOVA) (DO NOT DELETE)

574

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

2/17/16 7:48 PM

[Vol. 18:2

Rather, it continues a long-standing pattern of remedial Congressional
action following major systemic failures shaking the economy. The most
significant instances of such governmental intervention were the enactment
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19344 following the Great
Depression, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20025 in response to the DotCom Crash. Much the same way, Dodd-Frank was intended to build on
existing legislation to remedy the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and
provide strong compliance and reporting incentive structures to prevent
future market failures. One of the ways Congress sought to achieve this
was by “expanding and strengthening corporate whistleblower
protections”6 through Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision.7
Years before enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress had recognized
the need to afford protections to whistleblowers as part of a broad scheme
aimed at protecting financial markets. Industrialization in the United States
was coupled with an increase in the frequency and scale of corporate fraud,
which at times resulted in severe systemic problems.8 One of the latest
instances of the far-reaching effects of fraud on the financial system prior
to the adoption of Dodd-Frank was the stock market crash of 2002
following years of undetected accounting manipulation.9 The largest fraud
cases were revealed thanks to the internal and external disclosures of
several corporate employees, including the Vice President of Enron,
Sherron Watkins.10 The long-sustained violations, coupled with the
whistleblowers’ contributions in exposing the persistent unlawful activity,
prompted Congress to step in and enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the first
federal attempt at providing comprehensive uniform reporting protections.11
Its whistleblower provision covered both internal and external disclosures

Dodd-Frank was enacted as a response to Congress’s conviction that “financial institutions
cannot be left to regulate themselves, and that without clear rules, transparency, and
accountability, financial markets break down, sometimes catastrophically”).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-pp (2012).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
6. Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act,
113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014).
7. § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)) (“The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . is amended by inserting . . . ‘Sec. 21F. Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection.’”).
8. Robert E. Freer, Jr. & Raymond W. Burroughs, Unintended Consequences:
Sarbanes-Oxley and its Progeny, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 47, 50 (2010).
9. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
10. Freer, supra note 8, at 51.
11. Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A
Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 842 (2007).
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in an attempt to prevent future financial crises.12 The imperfections of the
Act, however, made the market crash of 2008 possible. In response,
Congress attempted to expand the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
protections in the Dodd-Frank Act.13
Unfortunately, the statute has presented an inherent ambiguity in
delineating who is protected from employer retaliation after blowing the
whistle. Section 922, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision, defines a
whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established,
by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”14 Read in isolation, the
whistleblower definition seems to indicate that only disclosures to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are protected under Section
922. However, the statute then outlines three types of disclosures protected
from retaliation.
The prohibition against retaliation provides that
employers may not discharge whistleblowers for (1) giving information to,
or (2) assisting the SEC in investigations, or (3) “in making disclosures that
are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . and any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”15
Since internal disclosure—made within a company rather than directly to
the SEC—is protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,16 the third prong,
read in isolation, indicates that those who choose to report a violation
internally are also protected from retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act.
The difficulty surfaces when one attempts to interpret the broad antiretaliation provision in light of the narrow whistleblower definition.
In 2011 the SEC issued a regulation to clarify the ambiguity.17 The
SEC ruled that while the narrow definition applies to whistleblowers
seeking monetary awards, the anti-retaliation provision covers three classes
of whistleblowers, including those who make internal disclosures.18 In
spite of the SEC regulation, courts have remained divided on the issue.
While the Second Circuit and district courts in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Nebraska, New York, Massachusetts, and Tennessee have
adopted the broad reading espoused by the SEC,19 the Fifth Circuit has
refused to defer to the SEC interpretation and has limited the anti-

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
2011).
18.
19.

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).
See Leifer, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2010) (emphasis added).
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2002).
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300 (June 13,
Id. at 34304.
See infra notes 40, 46-48 and accompanying text.
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retaliation protection exclusively to external disclosures.20
This Comment argues that the narrow interpretation defies
congressional intent and runs contrary to the goal of incentivizing
disclosure and responsible business practices. Additionally, instead of
achieving the goal of strengthening the incentives promoted by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the narrow interpretation has the potential to
undermine the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection, and lead to even
less disclosure than before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Part I provides a brief account of the history leading up to the adoption
of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision. Part II presents the ambiguity
of the statute and the SEC interpretation. Part III introduces the circuit split
in light of the statutory interpretation framework adopted by the Supreme
Court in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.21
Part III also analyzes the narrow and broad approaches, arguing for the
adoption of the broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision. First,
a proper Chevron analysis leads to the conclusion that the statute is
ambiguous in light of the statutory text and legislative intent. Second, the
SEC interpretation is reasonable and should therefore be granted deference
under Chevron. Part IV argues that adopting a narrow interpretation risks
undermining the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision, which the
Dodd-Frank Act sought to strengthen and expand.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Congress has long recognized the need to provide whistleblower
protections to encourage employees to come forward with information that
could help prevent, unearth, and discipline securities fraud. The steady
growth in the size and complexity of American corporations throughout the
twentieth century, coupled with the workings of the U.S. capital markets,
has consistently rewarded and so contributed to the increase of risk-taking
behavior, which has often been misguided and unlawful, and at times led to
major systemic failures.22 Such failures have historically been difficult to
prevent as employees have had little reason to report violations witnessed
in the workplace. Prior to 2002, whistleblowers “had to rely on the
‘vagaries’ of state law for protection [and] most corporate employers knew
exactly what they could do within state law to avoid a suit by a

20. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (outlining a two-part test for statutory interpretation).
22. See generally DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (David Kairys ed. 2005)
(providing recent examples of the pernicious effects of the trend toward excessive risktaking labeled as “Icaran” after the legendary risk-taker Icarus).
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whistleblowing employee.”23 As a result of the lack of meaningful
protections, violations remained undetected for years, and ultimately made
the stock market crash of 2002 possible.24 The uncovering of nearly half a
decade of fraud was largely due to the bravery of several employees of
large corporations who reported their concerns to management and the
SEC. In August of 2001, Enron’s Vice President Sherron Watkins warned
CEO Ken Lay of a series of improper accounting practices that later forced
the company into bankruptcy.25 Subsequently, a number of former
WorldCom employees reported suspicions of similar accounting violations,
later confirmed by the SEC.26 These and several other corporate scandals
led to the decline in investor confidence and the ultimate collapse of the
stock market.27
As the events unfolded, Congress recognized the need for better and
uniform reporting protections, and it enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an
attempt to prevent another market collapse.28 The whistleblower provision
covered internal and external disclosures, and forbade retaliation against
both.29 Congress’s decision to protect internal reporting was justified by a
number of advantages it offered, including relieving some of the pressure
from the SEC, enhancing the efficiency of internal controls, and avoiding
the waste of corporate and governmental resources where the suspicions
proved unwarranted.30 However, Congress’s execution of that policy
objective was imperfect.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provision
arguably provided insufficient protections to offset the risk of a job loss,
coupled with a set of procedural hurdles further discouraging disclosure.31
Some believe that the availability of monetary incentives undermined
internal compliance programs by encouraging employees to leave
violations uncorrected in order to report to the SEC and obtain an award.32
Partly as a result of the inadequacies of Sarbanes-Oxley, only six years
after the Act’s adoption, the nation suffered the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression.33 Congress’s response was the adoption of the Dodd23. Watnick, supra note 11.
24. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
25. Freer, supra note 8, at 51.
26. Id. at 51–52.
27. Id.
28. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).
30. For a more comprehensive discussion on the benefits of protecting internal
disclosure, see infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
32. Steve Spivack & Erin Sullivan, The SEC Whistleblower Program: What
Companies Need to Know, 21 BUS. CRIMES BULL., no. 7, Mar. 2014, at 3.
33. See generally GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE
CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS (2008) (characterizing the 2008 market crash
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Frank Act.34 Its goal was to build on and strengthen the protections of
Sarbanes-Oxley, and thus prevent another systemic collapse.35 Its success
in achieving that goal has recently been threatened by the Fifth Circuit’s
refusal to recognize the internal whistleblower protections.
II.

THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION AND THE
SEC INTERPRETATION

The language of the Dodd-Frank Act presents an internal
inconsistency between the whistleblower definition and the anti-retaliation
provision. Section 922, titled “Whistleblower Protection,” begins with the
general statement that it amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36
The statute then lays out a list of definitions applying to the remainder of
the section.
A whistleblower is defined as “any individual who
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”37 That definition read in isolation, therefore, seems to
clearly and unambiguously indicate that only individuals making
disclosures of suspected violations directly to the SEC enjoy the
protections of Section 922. However, Section 922 then continues by
outlining three instances in which retaliation is forbidden. The antiretaliation provision states:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act
done by the whistleblower—
(i)
in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;
(ii)
in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
Commission based upon or related to such information;
or
(iii)
in making disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .38
A quick consultation with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reveals that under

as the worst one since the mid-30s).
34. See supra notes 2-3.
35. Id.
36. § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
37. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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subsection (iii) the protection applies to any employee who has reported to
the SEC, Congress, or “a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.”39 Therefore, the third prong of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provision, read in isolation, seems to clearly and unambiguously define
three categories of whistleblowers protected from retaliation, including
those who make internal disclosures. Read together, however, the
whistleblower definition contained in § 78u-6(a)(6) and the anti-retaliation
provision in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) present a textual inconsistency within the
statute. The resulting confusion is centered on the inclusiveness of the
whistleblower anti-retaliation protection; namely, whether coverage
extends to all employees disclosing securities laws violations, or only to
those reporting to the SEC.
The direct clash between § 78u-6(a)(6) and § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) proved
confusing for courts almost immediately.
The court in Egan v.
TradingScreen was the first to address the issue in dicta, suggesting that
internal disclosures are covered by the anti-retaliation provision.40
In 2011, in an attempt to clarify the ambiguity, the SEC promulgated a
final rule addressing the issue of eligibility both for a monetary award and
for anti-retaliation protection under Section 922.41 The rule provides that a
public company employee is a whistleblower protected from retaliation if
he or she has “a reasonable belief” that the reported information “relates to
a possible securities law violation,” and the disclosure is made as described
by § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), the anti-retaliation provision.42 The rule further
clarifies that a whistleblower, as described above, enjoys protection from
retaliation regardless of whether he or she also qualifies as a whistleblower
for a monetary award under the bounty program.43 Therefore, the SEC
resolved the apparent conflict by adopting two distinct whistleblower
definitions for the two distinct incentive provisions of Section 922. To be
eligible for the bounty program and entitled to a monetary award, a
whistleblower is an employee who provides information to the
Commission, as provided in § 78u-6(a)(6).44 However, for anti-retaliation
protection purposes, the SEC defines three categories of whistleblowers, as
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2002) (emphasis added).
40. No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 1672066, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2011) (holding that the SEC had no jurisdiction in the case, but outlining four protected
categories of disclosures under Dodd-Frank, including internal disclosures protected under
Sarbanes-Oxley).
41. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300 (June 13,
2011).
42. Id. at 34363.
43. Id.
44. See id. (“To be eligible for an award, [an employee] must submit original
information to the Commission . . . .”).
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outlined in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).45
III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND CHEVRON

In spite of the SEC clarification on the issue, the confusion
surrounding the definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank has
continued. On one hand, the Second Circuit and the majority of district
courts have deferred to the SEC interpretation and adopted the broad
reading of the anti-retaliation protection. Just a few months after the final
rule was published, the Nollner decision came out citing both Egan and the
SEC rule to summarize in dicta that internal disclosures are covered under
the anti-retaliation provision.46
California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Nebraska, New York, and Massachusetts soon followed course, holding for
the first time that the broad whistleblower definition should apply to
employees seeking protection from retaliation.47 Most recently, the Second
Circuit in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC concluded that “the pertinent
provisions of Dodd-Frank create a sufficient ambiguity to warrant . . .
deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule, which supports [the broad
interpretation].”48 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has consistently
refused to follow the SEC interpretation, arguing that the statute
unambiguously defines a whistleblower as someone who has provided
information to the Commission, and that therefore the anti-retaliation
provision only applies to external disclosures.49 While the two lines of

45. See id. at 34304 (“[T]he statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three
different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category includes individuals who
report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission. Specifically, [§
78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)] provides anti-retaliation protections for employees [who report to] a
person with supervisory authority over the employee . . . .”).
46. Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993–95 (M.D. Tenn.
2012).
47. Bussing v. COR Cleaning, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v.
Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade
Holding Corp., No. 13-4149(SDW)(MCA), 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703 (D.N.J. Mar. 11,
2014); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters Mkts. LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v.
UBS Securities, LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084 (S.D.N.Y. May
21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Translux
Corp., No. 3:11cv1424(SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
48. 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015).
49. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013); see also
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (holding
that the statute is not ambiguous, and only those who fall within the definition of a
whistleblower are entitled to protection); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444T-33EAJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (holding that the
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cases reach a different conclusion, both follow the same course of analysis.
Since the dispute revolves around statutory interpretation, courts follow the
two-part standard laid out in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.50 First, a court reviewing an agency’s construction of
a statute needs to determine “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear.”51 If
congressional intent is clear and unambiguous, the court must adhere to it
regardless of the agency’s interpretation.52 If, however, “the statute is silent
or ambiguous,” the court must grant the agency’s interpretation
“controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.”53 In Parts III.A and III.B I argue that, in light of the
statutory text, the legislative history, and the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act, a
court may not reasonably determine that Congress clearly and
unambiguously sought to limit the anti-retaliation protection to external
disclosures. In Part III.C I argue that the SEC interpretation is reasonable
and must therefore be adhered to.
A. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Statutory Language and Structure Render
the Whistleblower Provision Ambiguous
Much of the disagreement over the interpretation of Section 922 lies in
the conclusions courts have reached with respect to step one of Chevron.
The Fifth Circuit, starting with Asadi, has consistently held that Congress
clearly and unambiguously meant to protect only external whistleblowers
from retaliation.54 The Second Circuit and the majority of district courts
adopting the broad interpretation, on the other hand, have determined that
the statute is inherently ambiguous.55 Both lines of cases, however, have
predominantly focused on the text and structure of Section 922. In

plaintiff who had not provided information to the SEC was not a whistleblower because the
Act unambiguously limited coverage to external disclosures); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F.3d
749 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (stating that the anti-retaliation provision only applies to
external disclosures, as unambiguously provided in the statute).
50. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 842–43.
53. Id. at 843–44.
54. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623; see also Englehart, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 2619501 (finding
that Congress “intended the whistleblower-protection provision to apply explicitly to an
individual who falls within the definition ‘whistleblower’ [as defined in §78u-6(a)(6)]”);
Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. at 644 (finding “no ambiguity in the statute at all” and adopting the
narrow interpretation).
55. Berman, 801 F.3d at 146; Connolly, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6; Yang, 18
F. Supp. 3d at 534; Khazin, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703, at *6; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at
1106; Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *4; Ronsenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147;
Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4.
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interpreting the statutory language, courts have almost universally cited to
TRW Inc. v. Andrews for the contention that “[i]t is a cardinal principle of
statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.”56 The adherence to the principle,
however, has led to divergent results.
Some district courts have found the statute ambiguous on the basis of
the “direct conflict” between §78u-6(a)(6) and §78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), and
have then chosen to protect internal disclosures concluding that the narrow
interpretation would render §78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) superfluous.57 They have
adopted the SEC’s reading, and treated §78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) as a “narrow
exception” to the definition of whistleblower.58 Most recently, the Second
Circuit in Berman has concluded that while there is “no absolute conflict”
between the two sections, there remains “a significant tension” between
them, which renders the statute ambiguous, and warrants deference to the
reasonable SEC interpretation.59 Asadi and the rest of the Fifth Circuit
cases, on the other hand, have found no tension between the two sections,
and have held that the plain language of the Dodd-Frank Act only affords
whistleblower protection to individuals who provide information to the
SEC.60 The court in Asadi attempted to reconcile the “perceived conflict”
between the definition section and the anti-retaliation section by attributing
it to a misreading of the statute.61 According to the court, §78u-6(a)(6)
delineates who is protected under the statute, while §78u-6(h)(1)(A)
outlines what activities are protected.62 Pursuant to this reading of Section
922, the definition provision serves as a gateway requirement that must be
satisfied in order to seek protection under the anti-retaliation provision. A
court must first determine that a plaintiff is a whistleblower pursuant to
§78u-6(a)(6), and only then apply the three-part test of §78u-6(h)(1)(A) to
56. 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
57. Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Connolly, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6;
Khazin, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703, at *6.
58. Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 1672066, at *5; Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 532; Murray,
2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *5; Genberg, 935 F.2d at 1106; Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist.
WL 4444820, at *5.
59. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150–51, 154–55.
60. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
61. Id. at 625.
62. Id. Relatedly, the court in Englehart asserted that a broad reading of the antiretaliation provision, inclusive of internal disclosures, “would contradict the section’s title—
’Protection of Whistleblowers.’” 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 2619501, at *8. No such
contradiction appears if the court adopts the SEC interpretation and assumes that §78u6(h)(1)(A), rather than §78u-6(a)(6) provides the definition of whistleblower for purposes of
the anti-retaliation protection. The court, however, fails to address the SEC interpretation
altogether.
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determine if the plaintiff’s actions are protected against retaliation.63
In choosing that reading, the Asadi court focused on the term
“whistleblower” used in the anti-retaliation provision finding it
“significant.”64 “If Congress had elected the terms ‘individual’ or
‘employee,’ [the broad interpretation] would follow more naturally because
the use of such broader terms would indicate that Congress intended any
individual or employee . . . to be protected from retaliatory actions by their
employers.”65 The problem with that statement, however, is that it is
almost tautological.
Had Congress used the term “individual” or
“employee,” the statute would present no internal inconsistency and
ambiguity, and the broad reading would be the only permissible reading.
The Asadi court therefore only stated the obvious: that the use of the term
whistleblower is what presents the ambiguity that gives rise to the
confusion. However, the mere fact that the court may not conclude that
Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to protect internal
disclosures does not prove the opposite, that Congress clearly and
unambiguously intended to only cover external disclosures.
The Asadi court, however, contended that the narrow interpretation is
the more logical reading of the statute, and that it would not render a
substantial part of the anti-retaliation provision superfluous, as some of the
district courts had argued.66 In support, it presented the hypothetical
situation of an employee who disclosed his suspicions to the SEC and his
employer on the same day, and got fired even though his employer was
unaware of the SEC disclosure.67 That employee, the court reasoned,
would be protected from retaliation against the internal disclosure under
§78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) because, by virtue of reporting to the SEC, he was
already a whistleblower under §78u-6(a)(6).68
While the court managed to conceive of a scenario where the two
sections would be reconciled, it did not advance the only reasonable
explanation. Rather, as argued by the court in Connolly, the two sections
“are—at a minimum—susceptible to more than one interpretation when
read together,” and nothing indicates that the unusual hypothetical situation
advanced by Asadi is what Congress intended to address.69 An alternative
63. Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he
‘whistleblower protection’ provided by Section 78u-6(h) is only available to individuals
who meet the Dodd-Frank definition of ‘whistleblower’ found in Section 78u-6(a).”).
64. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 627.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Connolly, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6; see also Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist.
WL 2190084, at *5 (“No doubt this reading of the two statutory provisions is permissible,
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way to reconcile the two sections may be that adopted by Egan, Kramer,
and Genberg; namely, that §78u-6(h)(1)(A) is a narrow exception to the
§78u-6(a)(6) whistleblower definition.70 This interpretation, endorsed by
the SEC, likely captures Congress’s intent better. First, the Asadi
interpretation addresses only a very unusual and rare set of cases. It is
difficult to imagine why one would choose to report a suspected violation
internally once he has already decided to report to the SEC. Upon
disclosure to the SEC, the employee loses the major incentives for
disclosing internally, such as “displaying loyalty to one’s company and
allowing for quick, efficient, and private resolutions of violations.”71 The
Asadi court did not claim that there had ever been such a case. Moreover,
as the court in Connolly acknowledged, citing to the SEC amicus brief to
the Second Circuit, “under Asadi, ‘clause (iii) would be utterly ineffective
as a preventative measure’ because ‘employers would not know that a
report was made to the Commission.’”72 Even if the hypothetical example
provides one possible explanation of the textual inconsistency, it is far from
the clear and unambiguous display of congressional intent required by
Chevron.73 As the Murray court concluded, “[t]he existence of these
‘competing, plausible interpretations’ of the statutory provisions compels
the conclusion that ‘the statutory text is ambiguous in conveying
Congress’s intent.’”74 By presuming one possible (and arguably not the
most reasonable) interpretation75 of the statute, the Asadi court effectively
skipped step one of Chevron, and engaged in impermissible judicial
lawmaking.76
The Asadi court, however, did not end its argument by offering a way
to reconcile the two provisions. It also contended that the broad
interpretation would render the definition section superfluous.77 The court
asserted that the words “to the Commission” would be given no meaning if

but . . . it is by no means mandatory.”).
70. Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 1672066, at *5; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106;
Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *5.
71. Leifer, supra note 6, at 139.
72. 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014).
73. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
74. Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *5.
75. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 745 (2014)
(describing the Asadi interpretation as “an attempt to grasp at straws to give meaning to §
78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)”).
76. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (holding that when a statute has been ambiguous, and
an administrative agency has interpreted the statute, a court may not “simply impose its own
construction on the statute”).
77. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628.
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the broad definition were adopted.78
This presents an interesting
juxtaposition with the stance taken by the Second Circuit and the district
courts outside the Fifth Circuit that adopting the narrow interpretation
would render part of the anti-retaliation provision “inoperable and moot”79
or, at best, “extremely limited [in] scope.”80 As illustrated by the SEC rule
and the Asadi hypothetical, neither concern is completely justified. The
SEC rule and the Asadi hypothetical both present possible ways to
reconcile the textual inconsistency.81 However, neither evidences that
Congress’s intent was clear and unambiguous. As the court in Murray
noted, the fact that both the broad and the narrow interpretation are
reasonable serves as evidence that the statute is ambiguous.82 And upon a
finding of ambiguity, the court must defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation rather than substituting its own construction.83 Even though
the Asadi court in another section of the opinion acknowledged the SEC’s
reading would avoid the problem by applying the narrow definition to the
bounty program, it failed to address it when stating that the broad
interpretation would render the definition section superfluous.
The Asadi court also asserted that the broad definition would render
the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection moot.84 The court recognized
that the greater monetary award, reduced procedural hurdles, and extended
statute of limitations in the Dodd-Frank Act, coupled with the broad
interpretation, would supplant the need to file under Sarbanes-Oxley.85
Although the statement is factually correct, it does not constitute a
persuasive argument for adoption of the narrow interpretation. As argued
by some courts and evidenced by legislative history, the Dodd-Frank Act
sought to remedy the shortcomings of prior legislation, including the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and to strengthen and expand its protections.86

78. Id.; see also Verfuerth, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5682514, at *3 (“The SEC’s
interpretation renders an entire section of the statute superfluous, namely, the definition of
‘whistleblower’ itself.”).
79. Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
80. Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *5.
81. See Khazin, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703, at *6 (“The SEC’s rule harmonizes the
contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act while not rendering any word or section
superfluous.”).
82. Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *5.
83. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
84. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628.
85. Id. at 629; Verfuerth, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5682514, at *4 (arguing that a broad
construction of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision “would essentially replicate and
render moot the SOX whistleblower protections already in place”).
86. See Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4 (asserting that “the Dodd-Frank
Act appears to have been intended to expand upon the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley”);
Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (acknowledging that
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“[T]hus the claimed problem is no problem at all.”87
Another court adopting the narrow interpretation used the SarbanesOxley Act as evidence that Congress intended to limit the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation provision to external disclosure.88 It argued that while DoddFrank sought to “improve the accountability and transparency of the
financial system, . . . it is not the only protection available to individuals.”89
The court advanced no justification for treating the existence of other law
providing protections against retaliation as evidence that the Dodd-Frank
Act should not and was not intended to broaden those protections. In fact,
there is at least some evidence that Dodd-Frank intended to do just that:
strengthen and expand the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections.90
One of the weakest arguments advanced by courts in finding the
statute unambiguous addresses the structure of the statute. The court in
Banko adopted the narrow interpretation, reasoning that since §78u-6(a)(6),
the definition provision, came before §78u-6(h)(1)(A), the anti-retaliation
provision, the latter was subordinate to the former.91 The court cited no
authority supporting the assumption that the order of the statutory text
could be used as evidence of the order of importance. It is even harder to
imagine it could be used as evidence of Congress’s clear and unambiguous
intent to attribute such order of importance to the sections of the statute.
In light of the direct textual conflict between the definition section and
the anti-retaliation section, the multiple ways to reconcile the
inconsistency, and the lack of a persuasive structural argument to the
contrary, the language of Section 922 remains ambiguous.
B. Congressional Intent Renders the Statute Ambiguous
In determining whether the whistleblower protection provision
presents an ambiguity, courts should look at the legislative intent not only
Congress intended to expand on the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley); Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d
at 730 (asserting that Congress aimed at “protecting a very broad range of disclosures,
including many to persons or entities other than the SEC”); Pacella, supra note 75, at 746
(2014) (“Dodd-Frank expands SOX’s antiretaliation provisions to address weaknesses that
have been revealed in the years since SOX’s enactment, thereby granting whistleblowers
better protections than what had previously been available under the law.”).
87. Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *5.
88. Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
89. Id. at 755–57; see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-GHW-SN,
2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6860583, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014), rev’d, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL
5254916 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (justifying its adoption of the narrow interpretation by the
fact that it “does not leave people who inform their employers of possible securities
violations without a remedy if their employer retaliates against them”).
90. See infra Part III.B.
91. Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756.
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by analyzing the statutory text. While both the courts adopting the broad
interpretation and those taking the narrow approach focused on the text of
Section 922, they largely ignored analyzing the whistleblower provision in
light of the broader statutory context.92 Here, the economic and legislative
history leading to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the
comprehensive changes to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in accordance with the
explicit goal of improving accountability and transparency, are instructive.
They reveal that Dodd-Frank likely sought to protect both internal and
external disclosures. At a minimum, they fail to demonstrate that Congress
clearly and unambiguously intended to limit the anti-retaliation protection
to external disclosures as required by Chevron for adopting the narrow
interpretation without according deference to the SEC interpretation.
The economic crisis of 2008 came as a shock to many.93 It marked the
conclusion of an era that had praised the ability of financial markets
unburdened by extensive governmental oversight to self-regulate through
the forces of the Invisible Hand.94 The market crash revealed an abundance
of widely used business practices, ranging from imprudent to illegal, which
resulted in the largest systemic economic failure since the Great
Depression.95 While the severity of the economic crisis of 2008 was of
almost unprecedented magnitude, it was not the first time in recent history
92. By finding the whistleblower provision ambiguous in light of the statutory context,
Yang is one of the exceptions to the stream of cases focusing entirely on the statutory text.
18 F. Supp. 3d at 534. The court in Kramer also considered the broad goal of the DoddFrank Act, “which was to ‘improve the accountability and transparency of the financial
system,’ and create ‘new incentives and protections for whistleblowers.’” 2012 U.S. Dist.
WL 4444820, at *4.
93. See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economict.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/V7ZF-DA2Z] (asserting that few economists predicted the
market crash of 2008).
94. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Bantam Classics 2003) (1776) (first advancing the idea of the
Invisible Hand: the idea that free markets naturally promote the interest of society through
competition); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 38 (40th ed., 2002)
(defending the efficiency of free markets, advancing the idea of minimal government
involvement in economics, and attributing the Great Depression to “government
mismanagement” rather than on an inherent instability of the free markets).
95. See generally SOROS, supra note 33 (characterizing the financial crisis of 2008 as
the worst since the mid-30s, and examining the contributing factors); see also Protecting
Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 225 (2009) (statement of Richard C.
Ferlauto) (“Under the disastrous sway of deregulation and lack of accountability, corporate
boards and executives either caused or allowed corporations to undertake unreasonable risks
in the pursuit of short-term financial goals that were devoid of real economic substance or
any long-term benefits.”).
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that leading economists had been surprised by the imperfection of weakly
regulated markets. The failures of Enron and WorldCom in 2000 similarly
revealed a multitude of improper business practices including unparalleled
accounting fraud that had gone undetected for years.96
Congress’s response was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a major piece of
remedial legislation aimed at strengthening governmental oversight and
implementing comprehensive reporting incentives and structures that
would prevent future systemic failures.97 Its goal was to provide a
comprehensive system of external and internal checks on potentially
unlawful business practices. Its whistleblower provision was designed to
achieve exactly that.98 It forbade employers to “discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an
employee” who provided information or otherwise assisted in the
uncovering of perceived securities violations.99
The anti-retaliation
protection applied regardless of whether the employee informed (1) a
federal agency, (2) a member or committee of Congress, or (3) “a person
with supervisory authority over the employee.”100 Thus, it covered both
external and internal disclosures.
In spite of the government’s attempt to prevent another economic
crisis through the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the market crash of
2008 followed in less than a decade. It led Congress to once again come
forward with a comprehensive piece of remedial legislation attempting to
96. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview;
Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersenfires-executive-for-enron-orders.html [perma.cc/3VQZ-8HGL] (“Enron was forced to
acknowledge that improper accounting . . . had resulted in overstating its earnings by almost
$600 million over five years.”); Simon Romero & Floyd Norris, New Disclosures From
WorldCom May Add to Accounting Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/02/business/new-disclosures-from-worldcom-may-add-toaccounting-scandal.html [perma.cc/A648-W5VC] (stating that WorldCom “had overstated
pretax profits by $3.8 billion in 2001 and early [2002], and that WorldCom admitted it may
have been tampering improperly with its reserve accounts for four years).
97. Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content, and Status of
Implementation
(Feb.
5,
2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm [perma.cc/3V64-XANB] (listing
“restoring investor confidence by strengthening corporate governance” as some of the goals
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
98. See Megan E. Mowrey, et al., Does Sarbanes-Oxley Protect Whistleblowers? The
Recent Experience of Companies and Whistleblowing Workers Under SOX, 1 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 431, 431 (2010) (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision was
adopted pursuant to the broader Sarbanes-Oxley goals to “interrupt, check, and prevent
illegal accounting practices”).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002).
100. Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
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improve the regulatory system governing the functioning of financial
markets.101 Much like the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sought to
remedy the issues leading to the Great Depression, and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 attempted to fix the practices resulting in the burst of the DotCom Bubble, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was designed to remedy the
systemic flaws of financial markets and prevent another catastrophic
failure.102 It sought to do that by strengthening and expanding the already
existing law,103 including through its “stronger and more expansive
whistleblower measures” as compared to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.104
There are several reasons why Congress may have deemed the
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision inadequate. First, the protections
may not have been strong enough to tip the cost-benefit scales in favor of
disclosure. For an employee to consider disclosure viable, the high risk of
losing his or her job and receiving no compensation would need to be offset
by a sufficiently high probability and magnitude of protection and
remuneration. This calculus likely influenced Congress in enhancing the
reporting incentives of Sarbanes-Oxley in Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
provision. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act compensatory damages include: “(A)
reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would have
had, but for the discrimination; (B) the amount of back pay, with interest;
and (C) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and
reasonable attorney fees.”105
While preserving the first and third
subsections almost unaltered, Dodd-Frank doubles the back-pay
101. See supra note 3.
102. Id.; see also Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by
Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance,
and Investment of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 226-27
(2009) (statement of Richard C. Ferlauto) (“It is time for America to get back on the road of
prudent financial regulatory oversight and increased corporate accountability.”); BAIRD
WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY (2010) (“Perhaps the major issue in
financial reform has been how to address the systemic fragility that was revealed by the
crisis.”).
103. Leifer, supra note 6.
104. Id. at 123; see also Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by
Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance,
and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 22627 (2009) (statement of Richard C. Ferlauto) (“In order to restore the confidence of
investors in our capital markets, it is now necessary to take the following steps: . . . Protect
whistleblowers and confidential sources who expose financial fraud and other corporate
misconduct.”); Pacella, supra note 75, at 746 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act sought to
address the weaknesses of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and grant whistleblowers better
protections).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2002).
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compensation, thus providing a stronger incentive to disclose a violation.
The relief under Dodd-Frank includes “(i) reinstatement with the same
seniority status that the individual would have had, but for the
discrimination; (ii) 2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the
individual, with interest; and (iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert
witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”106
Additionally, Congress may have determined that the Sarbanes-Oxley
180-day statute of limitations107 does not provide an adequate time window
for whistleblowers to gather sufficient information, report the suspected
violation, and commence an action seeking relief. Accordingly, DoddFrank extended the statute of limitations to six years from the moment the
violation occurred or three years from the moment the employee became or
should have become aware of the violation.108
Lastly, Congress likely considered the procedural hurdles of SarbanesOxley to have a deterrent effect on disclosure. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, a whistleblower may only bring a case to federal district court after
having filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, and under the
condition that the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180
days.109 Congress completely discarded that procedural requirement in the
Dodd-Frank Act. Instead, a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim may be filed
directly in federal district court.110 These changes, coupled with the
broader goal of the Dodd-Frank Act to remedy the market failures that led
to the crash of 2008,111 have led many to conclude that the Dodd-Frank Act
sought to strengthen the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.112 Apart
from the numerous statements based on legislative history that Dodd-Frank
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2010).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2002) (providing that a whistleblower may commence
a lawsuit within 180 days of the moment the violation has occurred or the employee has
learned of it).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2010).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2002).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2010).
111. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 2 (2010) (asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act was “a
direct and comprehensive response to the financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S.
economy beginning in 2008”); see also Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk
Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. 78 (2009) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) (arguing that “the over-arching goal [of the Dodd-Frank Act was
that] of protecting the financial system and the broader economy”).
112. See Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4 (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act appears
to have been intended to expand upon the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley.”); Murray, 2013
U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *6 (acknowledging “the congressional intent to expand on the
protections of Sarbanes-Oxley”); Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 730 (asserting that Congress
aimed at “protecting a very broad range of disclosures, including many to persons or entities
other than the SEC”).
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generally sought to expand Sarbanes-Oxley, there are arguments that the
whistleblower protection was no exception.113 The court in Bussing
advanced several reasons for protecting internal disclosures, arguing that
Congress most likely did not intend to “encourage an across-the-board
departure from the general practice of first making an internal report.”114
In light of the market crash of 2008, the explicit goal to “promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system,”115 and the marked boost of disclosure
incentives under Dodd-Frank in accordance with that goal,116 Congress
likely sought to build upon, strengthen and expand Sarbanes-Oxley.
Consequently, a court may not reasonably infer that Congress clearly and
unambiguously sought to limit the anti-retaliation protection to external
disclosures.
Rather, the broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision is consistent with the goal of Section 922 “to motivate as many
whistleblowers as possible to come forward with information pertaining to
law violations.”117 Thus, a court facing the issue of internal reporting may
not “impose its own construction on the statute,” but must adopt the SEC’s
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.118
C. The SEC Interpretation Is Reasonable
Because the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision is ambiguous, a
court must grant deference to the SEC interpretation under Chevron unless
it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”119 The
SEC rule must be granted controlling weight pursuant to Chevron, because
it provides a compelling interpretation of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
protection that reconciles the inherent ambiguity of Section 922.
As discussed in Part II, the SEC did not invalidate the narrow

113. See Pacella, supra note 75, at 727 (“In addition to reforms aimed at financial
regulation, Dodd-Frank created vast developments to incentivize and protect whistleblowers
to come forward with information regarding possible securities law violations.”); see also
Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 49 (2009) (statement of Paul Schott
Stevens, President and CEO, Investment Company Institute) (“[T]he goal of systemic risk
regulation should be to prevent or contain fires before they consume our financial system.”).
114. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733 (asserting that internal disclosure allows companies
to remedy violations early on, facilitates internal compliance programs, and helps vet tips to
the SEC).
115. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 106-110.
117. See Pacella, supra note 75, at 748.
118. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
119. Id. at 844.
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whistleblower definition of §78u-6(a)(6).120 A whistleblower seeking a
monetary award under the bounty program must still report to the SEC to
be eligible.121 However, the SEC clarified that a public company employee
seeking protection from retaliation qualifies as a whistleblower upon
meeting one of the three conditions under §78u-6(h)(1)(A).122 Therefore,
the SEC defined three categories of whistleblowers for purposes of the antiretaliation provision, including public company employees who report a
violation to a supervisor.123 The rule is in this way consistent with the
interpretation adopted by some district courts, namely, that §78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is a “narrow exception” to the whistleblower definition of
§78u-6(a)(6).124 It also avoids rendering any clause of the statute
superfluous, in conformity with the surplusage cannon of construction
espoused by TRW.125
The Asadi court attacked the SEC interpretation on several fronts.
Part III.A challenged most of them. First, the suggestion that the SEC
interpretation renders the language “to the Commission” in §78u-6(a)(6)
meaningless was shown to be unpersuasive in light of the fact that §78u6(a)(6) continues to hold in full force outside of the anti-retaliation
provision. Second, the concern that the SEC interpretation would obviate
the need to sue under Sarbanes-Oxley was relieved by evidence that in
enacting Dodd-Frank Congress intended to expand the Sarbanes-Oxley
protections.
In addition to asserting that Section 922 is clear and unambiguous, the
Asadi court maintained that the SEC interpretation is unreasonable and
should be rejected because parts of the rule are inconsistent with each
other.126 In support of that contention, the court compared the antiretaliation provision127 with the provision governing the procedures for
reporting a violation to the SEC.128 According to the Asadi court, it is
inconsistent to first define the term whistleblower as one who has provided
120. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
121. 76 Fed. Reg. 34300-01, 34363 (“To be eligible for an award, you must submit
original information to the Commission . . . .”).
122. Id. at 34304 (defining three categories of whistleblowers protected from retaliation
in accordance with §78u-6(h)(1)(A)).
123. Id. (incorporating the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision covering internal
disclosures in the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision).
124. Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 532; Genberg, 935 F.2d at 1106; Murray, 2013 WL
2190084, at *5; Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *5; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5.
125. 534 U.S. at 31.
126. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 (“[T]he SEC’s regulations concerning the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower-protection provision are inconsistent.”).
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9; see also Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 (discussing inconsistencies
in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision).
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information to the SEC or to a supervisor, and then to provide procedural
requirements for submitting information to the SEC.129 The court’s
argument is unpersuasive as there is no inconsistency between the two
sections.
The anti-retaliation section defines the categories of
whistleblowers, including both internal and external whistleblowers,130
while the procedures section provides the methods for making an external
disclosure.131 To be eligible for an award, a whistleblower must meet the
requirements laid out in the procedures section.132 However, to be eligible
for anti-retaliation protection, a whistleblower may—but need not—satisfy
the procedural requirements for award eligibility.133
Finally, as described in Part III.A, the Asadi court was able to come up
with an alternative way to reconcile the ambiguity of Section 922.134
However, pursuant to Chevron, where the statute is ambiguous and the
agency has provided a reasonable interpretation, the court may not
substitute its own interpretation for that of the agency.135 Step two of
Chevron is not a way for the court to use its discretion and balance the
perceived reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation against that of the
court. The agency’s construction must be given controlling weight unless
it is arbitrary or capricious.136 Since the SEC rule provided a reasonable
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision that reconciled
the internal textual ambiguity, it must be granted deference and be adopted
as the controlling interpretation on the issue.
IV.

THE NARROW INTERPRETATION RISKS ELIMINATING ALL
INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING

Apart from the legal rationales for deferring to the SEC construction
of Section 922, I argue that adopting the broad interpretation is more
consistent with the goals Congress sought to achieve with the enactment of
the Dodd-Frank Act. Limiting the protections of Section 922 exclusively
to external disclosures risks discouraging all internal whistleblowing, thus
stifling a goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In light of the evidence that
Dodd-Frank sought to strengthen and expand the protections of Sarbanes-

129. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii).
134. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627 (presenting the hypothetical situation of an employee
who reports internally and externally on the same day).
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
136. Id. at 844.
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Oxley,137 espousing the narrow interpretation risks running against the
intent of Congress in enacting the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act explicitly protects internal disclosures from
retaliation. Congress’s decision to include internal whistleblowers in the
statute is arguably justified both in theory and in practice. First, as a matter
of policy, Congress may have decided to alleviate some of the burden on
the already financially strained Securities and Exchange Commission by
encouraging employees to report suspected violations internally. Securities
violations often occur as a result of weak managerial oversight rather than
intentional law breaking by high-level management, especially in large
companies where active involvement by top executives is impractical.138 In
such cases, protecting internal reporting may enhance the efficiency of the
oversight system. Management would willingly investigate the reported
activity and remedy the violations even in the absence of SEC
intervention.139 That would be impossible if employees had no protections
because of the risk and consequences of retaliation they would face when
reporting violations to their superiors. Whether management is actively
involved in a suspected securities violation, and whether internal reporting
would be fruitful, can only be determined in hindsight. Thus, employees
that lack a sufficiently strong set of protections from retaliation would
forgo all internal disclosure, including such that would lead to immediate
and effective remedial action by management. Additionally, internal
reporting may avoid wasting corporate and governmental resources in the
instances where the whistleblower’s suspicions are based on a
misunderstanding rather than an actual violation.140
Moreover, protections for internal disclosures may be beneficial to
SEC enforcement even where management is actively involved in the
unlawful activity. Empirical evidence suggests that “internal reporting is
137. See supra text accompanying note 112.
138. Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving
Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 233
(2009) (responses to written questions of Senator Bunning from John C. Coates IV) (“As
firms grow in size in complexity, it may not be a practical goal to expect boards or even top
management to always know everything is going on inside the firms they run, any more than
it is practical for officials in the U.S. Government to know everything that is going on inside
the organization they oversee.”).
139. See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733 (“Internal reporting . . . allows companies to
remedy improper conduct at an early stage, perhaps before it rises to the level of a
violation.”); see also Pacella, supra note 75, at 753 (“Internal reporting provides companies
with a number of benefits, including investigating wrongdoing in the early stages,
evaluating the merits of reported violations, correcting problems in a timely manner, and
avoiding any negative publicity of problems that become known to the public.”).
140. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733.

ARTICLE 6_PETKOVA 2-12.DOCX (PETKOVA) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

INTERPRETING THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION

2/17/16 7:48 PM

595

the most common type of initial whistleblowing.”141 Therefore, internal
disclosure may often be an important first step to subsequent external
disclosure to the SEC for many employees. Discouraging internal
reporting does not necessarily mean that employees will be more willing to
report directly to the SEC. There are differences in the level of formality
and procedural hurdles between internal and external disclosure. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, for instance, to report to the SEC in the manner provided
by the Commission, one must “either . . . submit the information online,
through the Commission’s website, or by mailing or faxing a Form TCR
(Tip, Complaint or Referral).”142 An employee may feel more confident
and comfortable to share his or her suspicions with a superior, possibly in
an informal conversation at work, rather than initiating the process of
contacting a federal agency and following its strict procedural rules to
report a perceived violation. Additionally, as the Berman court noted,
some employees may feel that reporting a suspected violation to a
government agency creates a greater risk of retaliation than reporting to
management in a good-faith effort to elicit company action and right the
wrong internally.143 Thus, while an initial internal report may trigger
additional involvement and disclosure to the SEC upon management’s
reluctance to remedy the issue, possibly coupled with adverse action
against the whistleblower, an employee may simply lack the willingness
and incentives to initially report directly to the SEC. Moreover, some
categories of whistleblowers, such as auditors and attorneys, cannot report
a suspected wrongdoing to the Commission until after they have reported it
internally and awaited company response.144 Since “any retaliation would
almost always precede Commission reporting,” such categories of
whistleblowers would be left with virtually no Dodd-Frank protection in
the absence of internal protections.145 Finally, Congress may also have
been influenced by the fact that the Enron violations were largely revealed
by internal disclosures to the company CEO Ken Lay.146 As described
above, there are many reasons for protecting internal disclosure.
Regardless of the justifications, however, Congress’s intent in enacting the
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision was clear: to protect both internal
and external disclosures from retaliation.
141. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757,
1760 (2007).
142. Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4.
143. Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *6.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Text of Watkins’ Letter to Lay After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/16TEXT.html [perma.cc/2WLLHSYS].
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As discussed in more detail in Part III.B, The Dodd-Frank Act was
enacted in response to the financial crisis of 2008, and sought to strengthen
and expand prior law, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Since DoddFrank has been the latest say on whistleblower protections enacted to cure
the deficiencies of prior legislation and improve “accountability and
transparency,”147 potential whistleblowers are likely to presume that it
provides the strongest set of protections. Additionally, as the most recent
federal law on whistleblowing, Dodd-Frank is likely to be perceived as
Congress’s choice of policy on the issue.
Adopting the narrow
interpretation, therefore, may have an important impact on prospective
whistleblowers’ perceptions.
The awareness that internal disclosure is not protected under DoddFrank, coupled with the understanding that Dodd-Frank was designed to
expand Sarbanes-Oxley and enhance transparency, may signal that internal
disclosure is not protected at all. It may thus serve as a potent deterrent
against internal reporting.148 Research shows that fear of retaliation is
among the most common disincentives to internal disclosure.149 An
understanding that the law provides no protections against retaliation will
thus have a chilling effect on internal reporting. The inference, based on
the timing, goal, and structure of Dodd-Frank, that internal disclosure is left
with no protections against retaliation may not be strictly rational.
However, it is likely. Influenced by cognitive biases combined with
prevalent stimuli awakening those biases, even highly trained actors engage
in intuitive emotional decision-making. Investors are often tricked into
forgoing profitable investments due to loss aversion.150 Judges are
susceptible to making objectively unreasonable decisions as a result of
rhetoric in legal advocacy.151 Prospective whistleblowers are vulnerable to
intuitive emotional decision-making as well. The disincentive to internal

147. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
148. See Pacella, supra note 75, at 750 (arguing that the decision in Asadi will likely
have a negative impact on internal disclosure of violations as it leaves whistleblowers
“without the assurance that they may take advantage of the robust protections from
retaliation that have become available under Dodd-Frank when they make internal reports”).
149. Id. at 755 (“[T]he two most common explanations for why employees do not report
internally are fear of retaliation and feelings of futility if they choose to report . . . .”).
150. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity
Premium Puzzle, Q.J. ECON. 73, 74 (1995) (arguing that investors often value utility by
defining it “over gains and losses relative to some neutral reference point, such as the status
quo, as opposed to wealth as in expected utility theory”).
151. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the
Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 310 (2010)
(arguing that “[t]he early sections of a brief . . . can work as primes for the case as a
whole”).
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disclosure often arises from perceptions rather than actuality.152 Thus, the
perceived likelihood of retaliation influenced by and coupled with the
perceived lack of legal protections will negatively affect internal
disclosure. Much like Sarbanes-Oxley,153 Dodd-Frank has already been
attacked for undermining internal reporting by providing monetary
incentives to whistleblowers.154 Driven by the possibility of receiving a
hefty award, the argument goes, employees may choose to forgo internal
compliance programs instituted to spot and remedy violations early on, and
instead report directly to the SEC.155 If the concerns are justified, the
combination of the bounty program and the adoption of the narrow
interpretation risks chilling all internal whistleblowing.
Such an outcome would run contrary to the goals of both Dodd-Frank
and Sarbanes-Oxley. First, it would directly interfere with the policy
sought by Sarbanes-Oxley in adopting the whistleblower protections,
namely, encouraging both internal and external disclosure. In light of loss
aversion, any ambiguity as to whether internal disclosure is protected
would be intuitively resolved in a way that avoids risk. The risk associated
with reporting internally and being retaliated against will likely influence
decision-makers to make no disclosure. By virtue of interfering with the
functioning of Sarbanes-Oxley, adopting the narrow interpretation would
also run contrary to the goal of Dodd-Frank “to address weaknesses that
have been revealed in the years since SOX’s enactment,”156 thus
“minimizing the fear of retaliation and motivating whistleblowers to come
forward with information pertaining to securities laws violations.”157 Not
only would adopting the narrow interpretation fail to strengthen and expand
the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley; it would risk rendering part of it
inoperative. As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision
would be even less effective than before the adoption of Dodd-Frank, an
outcome contrary to the goal of Dodd-Frank.
The dangers to the effectiveness of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley
are amplified by several companies’ recent attempts to use contractual
provisions to prevent external disclosures. KBR has already agreed to pay
a $130,000 penalty to the SEC for including non-disclosure agreements in
152. See Jamie Darin Prenkert et al., Retaliatory Disclosure: When Identifying the
Complainant Is an Adverse Action, 91 N.C. L. REV. 889, 929 (2013) (“Perceptions of the
likelihood of retribution are just as important as the reality, if not more so.”).
153. Spivack, supra note 32.
154. Ben James, Big Awards Pushing Compliance Pros To Be Whistleblowers, LAW360,
Apr. 23, 2015, 7:25 PM, http://www.law360.com/articles/646731/big-awards-pushingcompliance-pros-to-be-whistleblowers [perma.cc/HDE6-BUKB].
155. Id.
156. Pacella, supra note 75, at 741.
157. Id. at 751.
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its employment contracts, prohibiting employees from reporting securities
laws violations to the government without permission from the company’s
legal department.158 While KBR did not admit and the SEC did not find
that the contractual provisions had in fact prevented employees from
reporting violations to the SEC, the existence of the non-disclosure
agreements was found sufficiently injurious to the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provision to warrant an enforcement action.159 The SEC is
currently investigating a number of companies for similar violations.160
The possibility that numerous companies may be using employment
contracts and non-disclosure agreements to discourage employees from
reporting externally, coupled with the possibility of adopting the narrow
interpretation of Section 922, risks having a chilling effect on all
whistleblowing activity. This is an outcome Congress surely did not intend
to cause when it enacted the Dodd-Frank Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

Limiting the protections of Section 922 to external disclosures
jeopardizes Congress’s goals in enacting both Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank. First, it risks undermining the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and rendering its whistleblower provision less effective than prior to
the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act. Thus, it directly interferes with
Sarbanes-Oxley’s unambiguous intent to encourage internal reporting. As
a result, it also runs contrary to the goal of Dodd-Frank to remedy the
weaknesses of Sarbanes-Oxley and provide a stronger set of protections in
order to incentivize the disclosure of securities violations. In light of the
statutory ambiguity, the reasonable agency interpretation, and the potential
of the narrow interpretation to undermine the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank, courts should grant deference to the SEC reading, and decide
in favor of protecting both internal and external disclosures from
retaliation.

158. Brett Joshpe, SEC Sends a Message About Whistleblower Treatment, FORBES, Apr.
2, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/brettjoshpe/2015/04/02/the-sec-sends-a-messageabout-whistleblower-treatment/ [ perma.cc/4H7X-WDVB].
159. Id.
160. Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC Probes Companies’ Treatment of Whistleblowers,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-companies-treatmentof-whistleblowers-1424916002 [perma.cc/UWK8-G5EW].

